Many are making the comparison to Noriega and Panama in 1989. Arguing, nothing special here - America does this kind of stuff all the time. There may be something to that in a narrow sense. But I guess the response would be that the context now is very different. Panama ended up being kind of a footnote, because the order-building dynamic was so strong in those years. Now the gears are in reverse. So there’s a superficial similarity between the events. But, in the end, Panama was just noise. Venezuela sends a signal.
that's a great point and you partly already answered it. panama happened at peak of US hegemonic consolidation and the liberal order was about to expand dramatically. I think violations during periods of order-consolidation are different than violations during periods of dissolution, when they become the new rule. And panama was done with liberal justifications on the surface (democracy promotion, drug trafficking, whatever). This is being done with essentially putinist justifications, and I think that signals what principles the great powers wants to govern the system
“Many analysts underestimate how authoritarian systems breed deep self-righteousness. Their elites may occasionally acknowledge own double standards in private, but more often genuinely believe they are morally responsible and legally righteous—even more so than the West …
“As a result, U.S. actions like the Venezuela operation allow authoritarian states to lower their threshold of acceptable behavior …”
Many people have said that Putin (or Xi) did not care about it and were/are restrained only by the opposition of force of arms so it doesn't matter in the grand scheme of things.
I think they miss the real significance of the current ongoing breakdown of the world order. It is one thing to say that in final analysis, all matters are settled by force but the consensus on how, when and what conditions it is allowed is very important.
I had mentioned in a twitter post a few years back but the real break from the historical past was not colonialism but the post-45 order with its rejection of wars of conquest, internationalism, and universalist orientation of dominant ideologies in both camps (liberalism/socialism-communism).
Yes, yes, there was tons of hypocrisy, the rules were honored in breach, and the Cold War was much more brutal outside the collective West, but an order where all that is thrown overboard and we return to the world of 19th century with 21st century technology would be way more brutal.
If the outcome of WW2 was different and we had ended up with a cold war between the US and Nazi Germany, for example, then the world and the "rules of the game" would be completely different from the ones in our timeline.
a large reason the decolonization movement became viable in the first place was that after 1945 both superpowers took a stance against it (for self-interested reasons). that's why poli sci theories of global norm evolution bother me, they're always bottom-up when in reality norm cascades are often the result of sudden shifts in hegemonic power
My favorite story about it is really NAM because it was this “global majority” organization which was important at some point with people in it having actual ideological beliefs and so on (one can get an idea that I hate the people involved but it’s not true, I hate the Westerners who still do conferences about NIEO while pretending that it was ever a real thing which is relevant to anyone today).
This is short note about how people expected that reaction to Iraq war would the reintroduction of morality into international politics but we got instead a full front collapse, people continue to say the words but they don’t actually mean it. It’s in the context of the fiasco that happened due to the collision of the public statements about Gaza vs reality from China. I’m not that mad for the Chinese not doing a lot, I didn’t expected them and it’s not my ideology, but it’s more about how the ideological stories of the 20th century collide with the reality on the ground.
I’m no fan of this Venezuela invasion, but since when does Putin need a green light? The international community has abandoned Ukraine. China, India, Brazil etc openly trade with Russia, even selling critical parts used to wage war on Ukraine. Many Middle Eastern countries side with Russia . International law has been dead for sometime
this has been the #1 pushback to my argument on social media as well. I think, as brazen as Russia is getting, it can still get worse for Europe and especially eastern Europe. it's true that Putin doesn't care about international law, that's part of my point. The question is what the US actively embracing spheres-of-influence logic means for Putin's risk calculus in places like the baltics or beyond
"When incentives favour escalation in attention and identity reinforcement, actors signal accordingly even if the real-world costs increase.
That’s what we’re seeing with Trump and allies like Hegseth in the buildup to, and execution of, the Venezuela operation.
The ongoing evidence suggests that for this political ecosystem, the expected reward from escalation still exceeds the expected cost, even after a dramatic action like a military operation. That’s why rhetoric continues to tighten rather than soften.
This is a pure incentive perspective, and it explains the direction of behaviour without any assumptions about intentions.
Until operating costs are imposed upon the Trump family then the identity driven escalation will continue."
Really insightful framing of this as a tripartite division rather than traditional great power competition. The spheres-of-influence logic makes perfect sense when you consider Putin's agentic power concept, he's not matching US/China economically but exploiting risk tolerance asymmetries to carve out autonomy. What gets me is how this incentivizes escalation in gray zones like the Baltics where hybrid warfare costs are low but reputational stakes for NATO cohesion are high. The quadrupling of Russian sabotage in Europe that IISS tracked suggests this dynamic is already playing out, and Kallas's weak response just reinforces that Europe isnt ready to fill the guarentee vacuum the US is leaving.
it takes ages to manufacture a solid statement in the name of 27 govs -- with 3 being headed by thugs. Claiming to first exchange input with NATO/allies might have been wiser ?
But the “Trump cares about Taiwan” scenario is WW3, isn’t it? So I read your first reply as “hoping” for a WW3. And considering that all of the current economic growth is tied into Taiwanese industry, I can’t imagine Trump being able to ignore it.
as in, cares enough to make it clear this would be unacceptable. deterrence and clear signaling would be the only way to avoid it. if china actually goes through with it then I don't know what the US can actually do, short of war
The carve-up idea works great until something important is at stake. I don't doubt that Trump cares nothing for "Taiwan", but "not having access to advanced semi-conductors" is going to affect him whether he cares or not. Likewise, China doesn't have to be a friend to Maduro to care about resource inputs from South America.
It is also doubtful whether Russia can really "contest" Europe. In the matter of escalating sabotage, success is its own failure, because it just provokes escalating European reaction. It's amusing to laugh at the inertia of European bureaucrats, but the reality is that they have already reacted, by enlarging NATO, increasing support to Ukraine, and embarking on re-armament programs. Sure, so far that amounts to Europe lifting its little finger, but that's just another way of saying that there's a lot of room for things to get a lot worse for Russia. And it doesn't require European unanimity either; all it takes is for France and Germany or France and the UK to decide that their interests are aligned.
My theory of the reason for the NSS document dividing the world into three zones of interest is this: the US regime knows global climate change is real, and fears mass migration of other cultures of brown people into the US.
Where is the natural barrier to this migration? The oceans. So the US must control all countries bounded by those oceans, to prevent this migration.
Canada is an issue for a different reason, because a short distance from Canada's northern border is Russia, and many people forget to consider this.
Also threatened: Canada; if Venezuela is in America's "sphere of influence", then Canada is doubly so. Also mealy-mouthed: the Canadian response. At the time I type this, Anita Anand has commented (an anodyne statement crafted to be meaningless) but the PM has not. I get that there are no good options here; but there is usually a least-bad option. Is that in fact the one being taken?
Many are making the comparison to Noriega and Panama in 1989. Arguing, nothing special here - America does this kind of stuff all the time. There may be something to that in a narrow sense. But I guess the response would be that the context now is very different. Panama ended up being kind of a footnote, because the order-building dynamic was so strong in those years. Now the gears are in reverse. So there’s a superficial similarity between the events. But, in the end, Panama was just noise. Venezuela sends a signal.
that's a great point and you partly already answered it. panama happened at peak of US hegemonic consolidation and the liberal order was about to expand dramatically. I think violations during periods of order-consolidation are different than violations during periods of dissolution, when they become the new rule. And panama was done with liberal justifications on the surface (democracy promotion, drug trafficking, whatever). This is being done with essentially putinist justifications, and I think that signals what principles the great powers wants to govern the system
Interesting argument in thread below
Though not sure I’m convinced that turbocharged self-righteousness on its own will affect behavior
https://x.com/zhaot2005/status/2007964269074371070?s=61&t=EUEPNorcS2G_uwppF61fMQ
“Many analysts underestimate how authoritarian systems breed deep self-righteousness. Their elites may occasionally acknowledge own double standards in private, but more often genuinely believe they are morally responsible and legally righteous—even more so than the West …
“As a result, U.S. actions like the Venezuela operation allow authoritarian states to lower their threshold of acceptable behavior …”
Many people have said that Putin (or Xi) did not care about it and were/are restrained only by the opposition of force of arms so it doesn't matter in the grand scheme of things.
I think they miss the real significance of the current ongoing breakdown of the world order. It is one thing to say that in final analysis, all matters are settled by force but the consensus on how, when and what conditions it is allowed is very important.
I had mentioned in a twitter post a few years back but the real break from the historical past was not colonialism but the post-45 order with its rejection of wars of conquest, internationalism, and universalist orientation of dominant ideologies in both camps (liberalism/socialism-communism).
Yes, yes, there was tons of hypocrisy, the rules were honored in breach, and the Cold War was much more brutal outside the collective West, but an order where all that is thrown overboard and we return to the world of 19th century with 21st century technology would be way more brutal.
If the outcome of WW2 was different and we had ended up with a cold war between the US and Nazi Germany, for example, then the world and the "rules of the game" would be completely different from the ones in our timeline.
a large reason the decolonization movement became viable in the first place was that after 1945 both superpowers took a stance against it (for self-interested reasons). that's why poli sci theories of global norm evolution bother me, they're always bottom-up when in reality norm cascades are often the result of sudden shifts in hegemonic power
My favorite story about it is really NAM because it was this “global majority” organization which was important at some point with people in it having actual ideological beliefs and so on (one can get an idea that I hate the people involved but it’s not true, I hate the Westerners who still do conferences about NIEO while pretending that it was ever a real thing which is relevant to anyone today).
This is short note about how people expected that reaction to Iraq war would the reintroduction of morality into international politics but we got instead a full front collapse, people continue to say the words but they don’t actually mean it. It’s in the context of the fiasco that happened due to the collision of the public statements about Gaza vs reality from China. I’m not that mad for the Chinese not doing a lot, I didn’t expected them and it’s not my ideology, but it’s more about how the ideological stories of the 20th century collide with the reality on the ground.
https://substack.com/@devlin/note/c-181178934
I’m no fan of this Venezuela invasion, but since when does Putin need a green light? The international community has abandoned Ukraine. China, India, Brazil etc openly trade with Russia, even selling critical parts used to wage war on Ukraine. Many Middle Eastern countries side with Russia . International law has been dead for sometime
this has been the #1 pushback to my argument on social media as well. I think, as brazen as Russia is getting, it can still get worse for Europe and especially eastern Europe. it's true that Putin doesn't care about international law, that's part of my point. The question is what the US actively embracing spheres-of-influence logic means for Putin's risk calculus in places like the baltics or beyond
I agree. My critique would be that these gradations of “getting worse” are a bit difficult to pin down.
Related:
"When incentives favour escalation in attention and identity reinforcement, actors signal accordingly even if the real-world costs increase.
That’s what we’re seeing with Trump and allies like Hegseth in the buildup to, and execution of, the Venezuela operation.
The ongoing evidence suggests that for this political ecosystem, the expected reward from escalation still exceeds the expected cost, even after a dramatic action like a military operation. That’s why rhetoric continues to tighten rather than soften.
This is a pure incentive perspective, and it explains the direction of behaviour without any assumptions about intentions.
Until operating costs are imposed upon the Trump family then the identity driven escalation will continue."
https://www.theangrydogs.com/p/trump-brexit-and-the-category-error
https://substack.com/@mattppea1/note/c-194764820
The likelihood is of even fewer or no consequences from the US for Russian escalations.
Trump did not invent the Monroe Doctrine or US coups in Latin America. And the rest of Eastern Europe is under NATO umbrella.
Really insightful framing of this as a tripartite division rather than traditional great power competition. The spheres-of-influence logic makes perfect sense when you consider Putin's agentic power concept, he's not matching US/China economically but exploiting risk tolerance asymmetries to carve out autonomy. What gets me is how this incentivizes escalation in gray zones like the Baltics where hybrid warfare costs are low but reputational stakes for NATO cohesion are high. The quadrupling of Russian sabotage in Europe that IISS tracked suggests this dynamic is already playing out, and Kallas's weak response just reinforces that Europe isnt ready to fill the guarentee vacuum the US is leaving.
it takes ages to manufacture a solid statement in the name of 27 govs -- with 3 being headed by thugs. Claiming to first exchange input with NATO/allies might have been wiser ?
Don’t you think it’ll turn into competition once China treats this as an invitation to invade Taiwan?
my concern is that Trump doesn't particularly care about Taiwan. I hope I'm wrong
I mean, idk what’s better, a 3-way carve up or WW3.
those increasingly look like the two options right now. I would take a global order where vice at least pays tribute to virtue
But the “Trump cares about Taiwan” scenario is WW3, isn’t it? So I read your first reply as “hoping” for a WW3. And considering that all of the current economic growth is tied into Taiwanese industry, I can’t imagine Trump being able to ignore it.
as in, cares enough to make it clear this would be unacceptable. deterrence and clear signaling would be the only way to avoid it. if china actually goes through with it then I don't know what the US can actually do, short of war
The carve-up idea works great until something important is at stake. I don't doubt that Trump cares nothing for "Taiwan", but "not having access to advanced semi-conductors" is going to affect him whether he cares or not. Likewise, China doesn't have to be a friend to Maduro to care about resource inputs from South America.
It is also doubtful whether Russia can really "contest" Europe. In the matter of escalating sabotage, success is its own failure, because it just provokes escalating European reaction. It's amusing to laugh at the inertia of European bureaucrats, but the reality is that they have already reacted, by enlarging NATO, increasing support to Ukraine, and embarking on re-armament programs. Sure, so far that amounts to Europe lifting its little finger, but that's just another way of saying that there's a lot of room for things to get a lot worse for Russia. And it doesn't require European unanimity either; all it takes is for France and Germany or France and the UK to decide that their interests are aligned.
i hope you're right
Fair! Prediction is hard, etc.
But Venezuela is very unlikely to inhibit European actions. Given the actual underlying resources in play, that can't be good for Russia.
My theory of the reason for the NSS document dividing the world into three zones of interest is this: the US regime knows global climate change is real, and fears mass migration of other cultures of brown people into the US.
Where is the natural barrier to this migration? The oceans. So the US must control all countries bounded by those oceans, to prevent this migration.
Canada is an issue for a different reason, because a short distance from Canada's northern border is Russia, and many people forget to consider this.
Not a good situation.
Only upside I see is weakening the excreble JD Vance who will be caught in a MAGA split.
Also threatened: Canada; if Venezuela is in America's "sphere of influence", then Canada is doubly so. Also mealy-mouthed: the Canadian response. At the time I type this, Anita Anand has commented (an anodyne statement crafted to be meaningless) but the PM has not. I get that there are no good options here; but there is usually a least-bad option. Is that in fact the one being taken?
There's more:
The Russian Roots of Trump's Venezuela and Greenland Operations. https://america2.news/the-russian-roots-of-trumps-venezuela-and-greenland-operations/?ref=america-2-0-newsletter